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IMRE VÖRÖS ∗ 
 
The Legal Doctrine and Legal Policy Aspects of the 
EU-Accession 
 
 
Abstract. The author deals with an important question of the Hungarian constitutional law, 
which question plays a relevant role during the accession process of a state of the European 
Union (EU). It means that the question of legal haromization always arises, when a state is 
going to join the EUZ. The author focuses on the question, whether the international law—
namely the law of the EU—or the national law should be privileged in given cases. The 
author introduces the possible conflicts between international law and domestic law with the 
help of several examples. The author refers to the numerous solutions of member-states of 
the EU and also mentions the situation of some would-be member-states, too. The author 
analyses the practice of the European Court, as wee by underlining some important cases, 
inter alia, the famous case of Van Gend en Loos. The author highlights the point of view that 
the Community law precedes the constitutions of the member-states. As a result of this the 
Hungarian constitution has to be modified in order to meet the requirements of the legal 
harmonization process, which will emerge with the access of Hungary to the EU. 
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I. The problem: A conflict between international law and domestic law 
 
1. De lege lata relationship between international law and domestic law 
 
1.1. In the first approach, the accession of Hungary to the European Union 
(EU) presupposes that the relationship between international law and domestic 
law is constitutionally settled.  
 In this respect, Hungary is not in an advantageous position. According to 
Para. 1 of Article 7 of the Constitution: “The legal system of the Republic of 
Hungary accepts the generally recognised principles of international law and 
shall harmonise the country’s domestic law with the obligations assumed under 
international law.” This article of the Constitution should be the governing one 
for the jurisdiction in case a conflict between domestic law and international 
law occurs, i.e., if international law, that is, an international agreement or inter-
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national customary law contains contradicting provisions to these of domestic 
law. 
 1.2. The emergence of this conflict has become more likely in a broader 
scope as a result of the process of integration of Hungary into international co-
operation with higher intensity since the transition in 1990. Hungary as a 
member state of the international community and the UN, and a signatory state 
or a contracting party to several international conventions in human rights or 
international economic relations obviously shall not dispose of such free scope 
of legislation, as it used to before accession to these international treaties. 
Becoming a member state to these treaties also implies that Hungary cannot 
create domestic law, which contradicts their content, whereas, with respect to 
effective domestic statutes, we are posed with the question concerning what way 
the lawmaker can resolve a potential conflict.  
 Some examples: The accession of Hungary to two human rights treaties (the 
UN Charter and the European Convention on Human Rights) excludes the 
codification of capital punishment, while our accession to the WTO 
Convention excludes the possibility of the imposition of e.g. discriminative 
customs fees. Furthermore, since our accession to the Washington Convention 
on the protection of foreign investments, the codification of such important 
fields, which would not guarantee immediate, unconditional and just indem-
nification and due process of law, is inadmissible. So long as the Republic of 
Hungary codified domestic law that is contrary to the international treaty, 
Hungary would be abjudicated and obligated to correct domestic law, either by 
the Strasbourg Court, which is competent in the area of human rights, or by 
the proceeding panel of arbitrators in the scope of the Washington Convention, 
or by the competent dispute settlement council in the scope of the WTO. If 
Hungary failed to comply, its liability under international law for the breach of 
an international treaty would obtain and ultimately it would be faced with the 
option of the “uphold of its membership” in the respective international treaty 
or the withdrawal. The uphold of “domestic law” however that is contrary to 
international treaties is not tolerated on a long-term basis by the dispute 
settlement mechanism of the these treaties. 
 In the scope of the European Agreement, the European Community-Hungary 
Association Council was established between the European Community and 
the Republic of Hungary, furthermore, the implementation of the Agreement 
was transferred to its competence. Accordingly, the Council promotes the 
implementation of the Agreement gradually by adopting adequate decisions 
framed in legally binding government decrees. 
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 1.3. The majority of international treaties, however, does not allow legal 
dispute settlement mechanisms: the requirement of the harmony between 
international law and domestic law, therefore, needs to be secured in general 
under domestic law, and in particular constitutionally, with respect to the fact 
that a fundamental problem of the functioning of the legal system arises. 
Therefore, the harmony needs to be guaranteed under the Constitution, since 
Para. 1 of Article 2 of the Constitution binds the Hungarian organs of juris-
diction, that is, courts and other authorities, to enforce the Hungarian legal 
system: (“The Republic of Hungary is an independent, democratic state under 
the rule of law.”). This principle and the deduced requirement of security in 
law, which prevails in the general practice of the Constitutional Court, 
positively imply the requirement above, disregarding the fact that the judges, 
government officials and civil servants, by taking an oath on the Constitution, 
take an oath that they shall comply with constitutional rules as well as assure 
that they are observed. 
 Therefore, an exemption from the constitutional liability to implement 
Hungarian domestic law also needs to be guaranteed under the Constitution 
itself and its instrument is that the Constitution positively and clearly takes a 
stand point concerning the relationship between international law and domestic law. 
However, Para. 1 of Article 7 of the Constitution quoted above is not adequate 
to achieve this goal. 
 1.4. Concerning the relationship of international law and domestic law, the 
following three issues shall be considered:   
— the monist-dualist conceptions,  
— a division between the technique of transformation/adoption codification, 
and in this context,  
— the issue of the self-executing and non-self-executing character of inter-
national treaties.  
The core of these well-known, fundamental issues of international law—on a 
simplified way—is as follows:1 
 a) According to the dualist conception, international law and domestic law 
are two separate legal systems in terms of substantive law. According to the 
monist conception they are not, therefore, international law as framed by 
several national legislators shall be applied by the domestic jurisdiction con-
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cerned, and so shall domestic law framed by the domestic lawmaker. According 
to the monist conception, the difference is merely formal: the former was made 
by several lawmakers, while the latter was made by a single one.2 
 b) The codification-technical consequences of the two conceptions, i.e., 
how international law becomes an integral part of domestic law, is deduced by 
the transformation-adoption model. According to the previous one, which 
echoes the dualist conception, separate domestic legislation, incorporation is 
deemed as necessary following the ratification, while according to the latter 
one, which “reflects” the monist conception, such incorporation procedure is 
unnecessary, since international treaties are incorporated into domestic law on 
their ratification and promulgation.  
 c) Finally, the conception, which attributes self-executing character to 
international treaties, is consistent with the monist-adoption conception. 
Accordingly, international treaties are to be implemented directly by the 
national courts and no separate rule of implementation is necessary to be 
enacted. 
 In the modern globalising world economy and world politics, with respect 
to the contemporary intensity of international relations and the increasing 
significance of regional integration, it is the monist-adoption, self-executing 
model, which can be considered as up-to-date. The problem, however, is that 
Para. 1 of Article 7 of the Hungarian Constitution quoted above shall not 
support either of these conceptions, since this provision is not positive, but 
ambiguous,3 meaningless and eclectic.4      
 1.5. It is no wonder that the Constitutional Court, when it applied Para. 1 
of Article 7, encountered significant difficulties.  
 1.5.1. AB Decision of 53/1993 (X.13.) (ABH 1993. 327) postulated or more 
correctly, “interpreted” a tripartite hierarchy in the Constitution, which is un-
justified or unformulated under Para. 1 of Article 7. Accordingly, the Constitution 
dominates the hierarchy, and international law is subordinated to it, whereas 
domestic law prevails at the bottom, neither of which may not contradict the 
levels above.  
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Közlöny, 1997, no. 5., 229–239. 
 
3
 Bragyova, A.: Igazságtétel és nemzetközi jog [Retroactive Justice and International 
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 Besides, the decision adopted the conception of German constitutional legal 
science and the idea of the German Federal Constitutional Court concerning 
Article 25 of the Grundgesetz,5 according to which the necessary transformation 
has already been implemented in principle and in general as pursuant to Para. 1 
of Article 7 of the Constitution with an effect to the future, therefore, no 
separate transformation is necessary.   
 The attempt for the “introduction” of the monist conception however, 
against the best intentions, was a failure. Since the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court, either as a result of its incompetence or simply of its insensitivity, 
disregarded a fact, which was also misconstrued by the “constructors” of the 
revised Constitution in 1989, namely, that Article 25 of the Grundgesetz 
pertained exclusively to international customary law, i.e., the general principles 
of international law, whereas a separate article, i.e., Article 59 based on the 
dualist-transformation model pertained to the international law of treaties.6 
Para. 1 of Article 7, which was definitely framed under the influence of the 
Grundgesetz, testifies both an awareness of Article 25 of the Grundgesetz and 
the fact that the legislators were not aware of the existence of Article 59.  
 Consequently, it is understandable that Para. 1 of Article 7 of the Hungarian 
Constitution specifies as a constitutional requirement merely the harmony of 
international customary law and domestic law, whereas, it does not take a 
stand on a harmony with international treaty law. Furthermore, it neglects the 
clarification of the hierarchical relationship between international law and 
domestic law.   
 The requirement of “harmony” in itself is both meaningless and ambiguous, 
since it can imply both 
 — the necessity to adjust domestic law to international law, and also its 
contrary:  
 — that international law is hierarchically subordinated to domestic law. 
This interpretation obviously excludes any participation in international 
relations, since in case of conflict, domestic statutes would have priority in 
jurisdiction. The mere possibility of such interpretation should be categorically 
excluded under the text of the Constitution itself. 
 1.5.2. The defective provision in the Constitution “transplanted” incompletely 
from the Grundgesetz, consequently, did not facilitate that the Constitutional 
Court, while it was framing AB Decision of 53/1993 (X. 13), which is other-
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 Grundgesetz. Kommentar. (hrsg.: von Horst Dreier), Mohr, Siebeck, 1998. Bd. 2, 
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wise loaded with a number of mistakes and technical deficiencies of inter-
national law, clarified the relationship between international law and domestic 
law in a reassuring manner.7 Hungarian special literature on international law 
has exposed the statements of the decision concerning international law to 
strong criticism (e.g. the original English technical term of adoption was 
misconstrued and translated as „adaptation“),8 and reached the conclusion 
that „the Constitutional Court ... drafted the decision irrespective of the doctrinal 
grounds of international law.9 
 Nevertheless, it can be definitely inferred on the grounds of the positive 
analysis of the Hungarian legal system,10 (not on the grounds of the analysis of 
the Constitution) i.e., of the provisions of Act XXXII of 1989 (Abtv) on the 
Constitutional Court concerning competence and procedural law. One has to 
take into consideration especially its Point c) of Article 1, Para. 3 of Article 21 
and Articles 44–46 that the Hungarian legal system is constituted on the basis 
of the dualist conception, the transformation technique and on the recognition of 
the non-self-executing character of international treaties.  
 The “settlement” of the issue in such a ruling is, of course, an absurdity in 
constitutional law. 
 1.5.3. The Constitutional Court in its AB Decision of 4/1977 (I. 22.) (ABH 
1997. 41.) reaffirmed its former standpoint and corrected some of its mistakes, 
which, however, did not modify the fact that the body in itself as a “legislator” 
did not manage to readjust the Hungarian legal system from the dualist-
transformation, non-self-executing model to the monist-adoption, self-executing 
model.11  
 1.5.4. To sum it up, we can assert that the Hungarian Constitution does not 
contain a judicially governing provision either on the status of international 
law in the hierarchy of the sources of law, or on the admissibility or constitu-
tionality of the direct application of the norms of international law by the 
Hungarian courts.  
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 Bragyova: op. cit., 218. 
 
9
 Bodnár: op. cit., 22. 
 
10
 Vörös: Az Európai Megállapodás… op. cit., see, especially, the explications in 
part IV. 
 
11
 See, my dissenting opinion attached to the decision (ABH 1997, 53–54.); see also, 
Vörös, I.: Dixi et salvavi, Különvélemények, párhuzamos indokolások (Dissenting 
Opinions and Parallel Motivations), Budapest, 2000, 107.  
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2. Some foreign examples:  
 
This is not the case in a number of foreign legal systems. Article 28 of the Greek 
Constitution and Article 15 of the Russian Constitution positively sets forth 
— the priority of international law versus domestic law and 
— the doctrine of the obligation that national courts and other authorities 
directly enforced international law. Surprising as it may seem, Article 122 
of the Albanian Constitution also contains a very high-standard provision.12 
 In the Czech Republic, the Constitution was amended on 18 October, 2001 
expressly in the framework of the preparation for the EU-Accession. In that 
framework, the relationship between international law and domestic law was 
also settled. Article 10 of the Constitution accordingly specifies: “Those 
promulgated international treaties, the ratification of which the parliament 
consented to and which bind the Czech Republic, shall be part of its legal 
system. If such an international treaty provides otherwise than domestic law, 
the provisions of the international treaty shall be applied.”  
 
 
II. Legal  doctrinal  bases 
 
1. Three fundamental problems:  
 
The clarification of the legal doctrinal bases necessitates the analysis of three 
legal doctrinal issues: 
— the relationship between international law and domestic law, 
— the transfer of sovereign rights, and as a special sub-category of this 
 second scope of issues, 
— the problem of the potential transfer of sovereign rights specifically to the EU. 
 1.1. The unsettled character of the relationship between international law 
and domestic law 
 a) Since the relationship between international law and domestic law in the 
Hungarian Constitution can be construed as an open question, the relationship 
between the Hungarian legal system and the law of the European Community 
is also unsettled. 
 b) That is not a simple issue even in the relationship between the legal 
system of the member states and Community law, since both the Italian13 
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 Czuczai, J.: The Legal Alignment Process with the Constantly Evolving Consti-
tutional acquis of the EU in Central and Eastern Europe, Európa, 2002, 1 March 2001. no. 
1., 3. sqq. 
148 IMRE VÖRÖS 
  
and the German Constitutional Courts14 have expressed their reservations 
concerning the absolute interpretation of the priority of Community law, 
according to which the latter prevails over not only a significant part of 
constitutional rules and other domestic statutes, but also over the national-
member state constitutions.  
 In its Frontini-Decision, the Italian Constitutional Court set forth the limits 
of the doctrine of the priority of Community law (the issue of which we revert 
to later) as laid down and proclaimed by the European Court of Justice, which 
emphasised that although Community law could actually overrule the Italian 
Constitution, however, it shall certainly not overrule either inalienable rights 
guaranteed to persons under the Constitution or the fundamental principles as 
pursuant to the Constitution. Although, Article 11 of the Italian Constitution 
provides for the admissibility of the transfer and, consequently, the limitation 
of sovereignty, nevertheless, the fundamental principles and rights above are the 
“counter-balances” and “controlimiti” of this constitutionally guaranteed option. 
In its Fragd-Decision of April 21st of 1989, the Constitutional Court reserved 
the right to review the issue whether the respective regulations of Community 
law and the articles of the Italian Constitution concerning the protection of 
human rights are in accordance.15  
 The German Federal Constitutional Court equally held that Community law 
shall not have absolute priority over the protection of fundamental rights as 
guaranteed under the German Grundgesetz, until Community law provides 
similar protection: the constitutionality of Community law in this respect shall 
be constitutionally measured against the norms of the Grundgesetz. 
 c) These statements, according to the interpretation of de Witte, imply that 
the thesis of the relative priority of Community law prevails concerning the 
                               
 
13
 On the priority of Community law, see, Várnay, E.—Papp, M.: Az Európai Unió 
joga (The Law of the European Union), Budapest, 2002. 235, and the following pages. On 
the decisions of the Italian Constitutional Court, see, de Witte, B.: Constitutional Aspects of 
European Union Membership in the Original Six Member States: Model Solutions for 
the Applicant Countries? In: EU Enlargement. The Constitutional Impact at EU and 
National Level (ed.: A. Kellermann, J. W. de Zwaan, J. Czuczai), The Hague, 2001. 74. 
sqq.  
 
14
 The Maastricht-Judgement, BVerfGE 89, 155, The “Solange”-Judgements, e.g., 
BverfGE 73, 339, the argumentation of which was recently affirmed by the Federal 
Constitutional Court in its ruling of 7 June 2000, BverfG, 2 BvL 1/97, Europäisches 
Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 2000. 702. 
 
15
 Gaja, G.: New Developments in a Continuing Story: The Relationship between 
EEC Law and Italian Law, Common Market Law Revue, 1990. 83. 
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relationship between the constitutions of the member states and Community 
law, thereby, they refute the doctrine of absolute priority.16 
 d) The relevance of the problem is adequately demonstrated by the confusion, 
which occurred when the Hungarian Constitutional Court dealt with the 
motion related to the unconstitutionality of Article 62 of the European 
Agreement on the Establishment of an Association between the Republic of 
Hungary and the European Communities and their Member States ratified under 
Act I of 1994. In my print of view, the Constitutional Court does not have 
competence to deal with the subsequent norm control of an international treaty 
even if it was ratified in compliance with the transformation conception,17 since 
the constitutionality of an international treaty can only and exclusively be 
examined in the scope of a preliminary norm control (Point a) of Article 1 of 
Abtv.).   
 da) The Constitutional Court disregarded this minor “triviality” of procedural 
law, examined the motion on its merits and in its AB Decision of 30/1998 (VI. 25) 
(ABH 1998, 220.) it arrived at the conclusion that Para. 2 of Article 62 of the 
European Agreement, which specified competition law prohibitions, is not 
expressly unconstitutional, nevertheless, the Court stipulated constitutional 
criteria for its implementation.18 According to the decision, the constitutional 
criterion is that Hungarian courts and judges authorities may not directly 
implement the application criteria as pursuant to Para. 2 of Article 62, which 
refer to and are contained in Community law. 
 Whereas, the Constitutional Court held that two provisions of the European 
Community-Hungary Association Council included in the Supplement of 
Government Decree no. 2320/1996 (XII. 26.) are unconstitutional and thereby 
annulled them, whereas, they were purported to implement the provisions of 
Article 62.  
 db) The decision (ABH 1998, 226–227), which was adopted not only in the 
absence of competence and sufficient knowledge of European law and in 
several technical respects wrongly, contested the immediate effect and direct 
applicability of Article 62 of the European Agreement, while it misinterpreted 
the content of the second notion above as established in the science of 
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 de Witte: ibid. 
 
17
 See, note 11. 
 
18
 The Constitutional Court is not competent to determine the “constitutional 
criteria”, since no Hungarian statute authorises it to apply such legal consequences. The 
body applies this legal consequence prescribed by itself contra legem, and what is an 
even graver mistake, contra constitutionem. See, Dissenting Opinion of Constitutional 
Court Justice, Vörös, I.: Dixi et salvavi (note 11.) 71, 92, 110.   
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international law.19 Relying on that, the decision in a self-contradicting manner 
concluded that in commercial relations between the member states and 
Hungary respective Hungarian law, i.e., Competition Act (No. LVII of 1996 on 
the Prohibition of Unfair and Restrictive Market Practices) shall be applicable 
with respect to the criteria specified under Community law. 
 The standpoint above is defective on the grounds that if there are inter-
national elements in relations of civil law, family law or labour law, the rules 
on international collision of private law prevail, since these norms define 
which law should be applied.20 Article 62 shows familiarity primarily with 
civil law, since it pertains to the market conduct and competition conduct of 
companies—competition restrictions or abuse of economic superiority. In view 
of the fact that it is a competition law rule, those rules, which fundamentally 
bear the character of private law obtain together with those norms, which bear 
the character of public law and codify state intervention. Hence, such scope of 
legal norms as a typical instance of omnibus law shall not fall either under 
“private law” or “public law”, but they are part of business law, which combines 
the elements of both branches of law.  
  At the end of the 20th century, we cannot set out from a conception of the 
dualism of “public law” and “private law”, unless we admit our legal technical 
ignorance, and especially, we cannot base a constitutional court decision on 
that doctrine. As it is known, the dualism based on this structure disintegrated 
in the second half of the 19th century.21 
 The Decision of the Constitutional Court, framed in the absence of the 
knowledge of the content and legal relevance of the interstate commerce clause, 
is misconstrued not only with respect to the fact that in such cases it is 
Hungarian law that shall be applied, but also when it considers competition 
law as part of “public law” (ABH 1998, 230): the application of Article 62 
„shall incur that relations under public law are effective”. By accumulating 
these misconceptions, the Constitutional Court concluded that since the criteria 
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 According to my view, Article 62 has direct effect and needs to be implemented 
directly. See, Vörös, I.: Az Európai Megállapodás… op. cit. Point 3.3., Part IV.  
 
20
 Burián, L.—Kecskés, L.—Vörös, I.: Magyar nemzetközi kollíziós magánjog [Hungarian 
International Collision Private Law], 4th edition, Budapest, 2001, 70–75. 
 
21
 Rittner, F.: Wirtschaftsrecht, 2nd edition, 1987, 10
−
23., Eörsi, Gy.: Jog—gazdaság—
jogrendszer-tagozódás [Law, Economy, the Structure of the Legal System], Budapest, 
1977. 65., 73., 79., 110. Here, Eörsi develops the arguments adduced in his previous 
work: Összehasonlító polgári jog [Comparative Civil Law], Budapest, 1975, 85, and the 
following pages, and Chapter VI., on the basis of the conclusions drawn from the law 
of Western market economies, at the same time, challenges the relations of planned 
economy. 
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under Community law entail the mandatory application of criteria pertaining to 
relations under public law by the Hungarian jurisdiction, and that is exactly 
what the rule of implementation provides for. Consequently, the rule violates 
the constitutional requirement that a democratic state under the rule of law 
(Para. 1 of Art. 2) prevails, and therefore, it is unconstitutional. According to 
the Constitutional Court, the violation consists in the fact that these criteria are 
not promulgated under a domestic statute (ABH 1998, 233).  
 dc) The complicated nature and the intricate technical legal difficulties of 
the argument reveals that the Constitutional Court—with its reference to 
53/1993 (X. 13.) ABH and 4/1997 (I. 22) ABH—made a renewed attempt 
without avail to clarify the relationship between domestic law and international 
law. The case could have exposed a specifically problematic aspect of the 
relationship between Community law and domestic law (n.b. not the domestic 
law of a member state), if the Decision of the Constitutional Court had 
recognised it at all.  
 dd) The solution reached finally, i.e., the enumeration of the sources of 
Community law that contain the Community law criteria to be applied under 
Act X of 2002, is in accordance with a casual phrase of the decision (... 
“without the respective criteria following from ... a domestic source of law”). 
This phrase, however, contradicts the overall purpose of the decision, since, if 
the application of foreign law in relations under “public law” is inadmissible as 
pursuant Para. 1 of Article 2 of the Constitution, then this, in principle, is 
inadmissible even if these criteria are specified under a separate statute. 
Namely, the Constitution does not a contain a provision, which stipulates the 
conditions of the transfer of sovereign rights. Therefore, the transfer of 
sovereign rights or of the exercise of powers, which in the present case hides 
in the background of the issue of the domestic application of statutes adopted 
by foreign legislation, is deemed as inadmissible. 
 The doctrine that Hungary shall be a democratic state under the rule of law 
as pursuant to Para. 1 of Article 2 does not entail that if the criteria of the 
application of foreign “public law” is proclaimed under a domestic statute 
(ABH 1998, 223), then the application of a foreign “public law” rule is 
constitutional, since this provision does not constitute such possibility for 
exemption or an exception. Para. 1 of Article 2 is a categorical requirement, 
which allows no exception, therefore it cannot substantiate the reference by 
the Constitutional Court to domestic promulgation in order to qualify the 
application of foreign “public law” as constitutional.  
 As a result of this, Act X of 2002 on the grounds of 30/1998 (VI.25) ABH 
would probably fail to pass the test of constitutionality.  
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 de) Law-Decree Act 13 of 1979 on international private law would also fail 
to pass such a test, since the argument the decision follows fails to offer an 
explanation why a constitutionally bianco authorisation for the application of a 
constantly changing foreign legal system can be granted under the norms of 
“private law”. This is not substantiated or expounded either sufficiently or 
doctrinally in view of the fact that here “public law” norms and legal relations 
with ambiguous content and legal constitution are constructed in an isolated 
manner, detached from the legal system. 
 df) The basic problem is not if the European Agreement pertains to “public 
law” relations and norms, but whether that international agreement has priority 
over domestic law or not. The decision does not adequately respond to the 
expressly specific question in terms of Community law.  
 1.2. The unsettled character of the transfer of sovereign rights 
 a) As the argument of 30/1998 (XI. 25.) ABH also pointed out, a further 
doctrinal problem lies in the background. The decision admits that the 
problem delineates in that direction so far as the limitation of sovereignty, 
transfer of sovereign rights and of exercise of powers are concerned (ABH 
1998, 232), however, it deals with these aspects only in the general context of an 
“independent, democratic state under the rule of law”. We have to admit that it 
cannot do otherwise, since the Constitution does not take a stand point concerning 
the transfer of sovereign rights to an international organisation, either.  
 b) The content-based aspect as simplified is that the prerequisite of 
international co-operation is the establishment of an open state, which, how-
ever, in a given case facilitates the limitation or transfer of sovereignty. The 
openness that is indispensable in times of economic and political globalisation 
positively entails that norms prescribed by a transnational organisation may 
enter the Hungarian legal system, which are not necessarily substantiated by 
Paras. 1 and 2 of Article 2 of the Constitution. Therefore the sovereignty of the 
Hungarian people will not legitimise them.  
 The modern conception of sovereignty, which designates the people as the 
depositary of sovereignty, may make easing to solve the doctrinal problem. 
The conception of the state as opened by the constitutions in the direction of 
international co-operation, which is adequately determined as “kooperativer 
Verfassungsstaat” by Haberle,22 as a matter of fact resolves the problem of the 
democratic “deficit” related to the transfer of sovereign rights, since in such 
cases it is the constitution of the respective state, which frames the conditions 
of the transfer and of constitutionality. 
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 Häberle, P.: Kooperativer Verfassungsstaat, in: Verfassung als öffentlicher Prozess, 
2nd edition, 1996, 407. 
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 c) The formal requirement following from the conception of the sovereignty 
of the people is that it is exclusively the people that can transfer sovereign 
rights, therefore, the transfer shall be prescribed in the scope of an act by the 
institution of the representation of the people.  
 According to that conception, it is the people that constitutes the inter-
national (interstate) organisation and also endows it with adequate competence 
to comply with its obligations according to the discretion of the representation 
of the people. When applicable, the transfer will impair the scope of sovereign 
rights of the representation of the people, while that scope of the international 
(interstate) organisation shall be constituted, or it increases under a subsequent 
amendment of an agreement. This, as long as the consequences are concerned, 
may modify the constitutional status of the citizens of the respective state, 
hence, its settlement is inevitable under an act. 
 1.3. A special instance of the transfer of sovereign rights: the transfer of 
sovereign rights to the European Union   
 The transfer of sovereign rights to the EU construed as the content and the 
essential element of the accession process cannot be identified with the general 
transfer of sovereign rights to an international organisation. The EU postulates 
the sovereignty of the member states, since it is not a federation of states and 
as a consequence of its constantly evolving, developing structure, its frame-
work cannot be determined with legal exactness even on a short-term run. The 
European Union is constituted on the European peoples, not on an abstracted 
notion of a single, non-existent people, in which the sovereign rights derive 
from the peoples of the member states with the mediation of the member states: 
the EU develops on an intergovernmental basis.23 The legal definition of 
Europe, which forms the European Union, is a difficult task even for German 
legal science reputed for its conceptual thought, its Begriffshimmel.24 
 As a consequence of the uncertainty of the conceptual definition, the 
doctrinal challenge is the issue of the priority of Community law, which 
challenges the rights of the member states and has been a conditio sine qua 
non of the European Community, which today is the EU. As we noted, 
(II.1.1.b), the problem is highlighted in the relationship to the Constitutions. 
The problem can be approached via the doctrine of absolute priority in legal 
relations and legal branches, however, in the area of the relation to the 


 
23
 Rittner, F.: Az Európai Unió útja a szövetségi állam felé (The Progress of the 
European Union in the Direction of a Federal State), Jogtudományi Közlöny (1995) no. 6., 
286.  
 
24
 Häberle, P.: Európa mint formálódó alkotmányos közösség (Europe as a Constitutional 
Community in the Process of Formation), Jogtudományi Közlöny (2001) no. 10, 432. 
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constitutions, the priority has been relativised in the legal practice of the 
Constitutional Courts. In this context, i.e., in a segment of the relations under 
constitutional law, in which the determinant, the “strong core” is the protection 
of fundamental rights by the constitutions of the member states, the doctrine of 
the absolute priority does not obtain.  
 With respect to these, the transfer of sovereign rights to an interstate 
organisation, which is vaguely qualified and outlined under international law 
and vindicates, by all means, absolute or relative a priority for its constantly 
evolving legal system, can be posited as a special doctrinal issue. 
 The specific explication of that problem as a third issue distinct from the 
previous two ones is deemed as inevitable. 
 
 
III. Legal political basis 
 
From the analyses above, around the three issues dealt further legal political 
consequences emerge, and consequently, the following constitutional problems 
arise. 
 
1. On the relationship of international law and domestic jurisdiction 
 
1.1. The lawmaker needs to make a positive legal political decision concerning 
that on the grounds of which conception the Hungarian legal system “shall be 
arranged”. In our view, with respect to doctrinal considerations, it cannot be 
doubted that Hungarian law in the future should follow a scheme, which is 
based on the monist conception with the application of the adoption-codification 
technique and the recognition of the self-executing character of international 
treaties.  
 1.2. Which necessitates that the Constitution, instead of the present Para. 1 
of Article 7, prescribes that  
— the ratified and promulgated international treaties shall be part of the 
Hungarian legal system,  
— in the event of a collision between these international conventions and 
domestic Hungarian statutes, the provisions of international treaties shall 
prevail. In such cases, in case doubt is arisen, the court and other 
authorities shall enforce the international treaty, which implies that the 
jurisdiction is entitled to take a decision whether a harmony between all 
other statutes, except for the Constitution, and the respective international 
treaty prevails, 
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— the international treaty incurs a direct obligation for the jurisdiction, which 
implies that the adoption of a further rule of implementation shall not be 
necessary. 
 1.3. The amendment of the Constitution shall obviously not supersede the 
streamlining of the law on international treaties, since the currently effective 
Act XXVII of 1982 is completely out-of-date and inapplicable. 
 1.4. Without the amendment of the Constitution and framing a new statute 
on international treaties, not only the relationship between international law 
and domestic law remains unsettled, but we can’t take a reassuring stand on 
the issue of domestic law and Community law in a reassuring manner, either. 
The two issues are closely related. The issue of the relationship to Community 
law is preceded by urgency of the constitutional settlement of  transfer of 
sovereign rights with respect to the fact that in that relationship on the one 
hand the issue of the transfer of sovereign rights, on the other hand, the issue 
of the priority of Community law are inseparably intertwined. 
 
2. The transfer of sovereign rights to an international, interstate organisation 
 
2.1. The Hungarian constitution does not take an stand on the transfer of 
sovereign rights. 
 a) Para. 2 of Article 6 prescribes the endeavour to co-operate with all people 
and states of the world, which obviously does not entail that in a given case any 
kind of transfer of sovereign rights and exercise of powers is not uncons-
titutional with special respect to Para. 1 of Article 2 of the Constitution. The 
constitutional fate of Article 62 of the European Agreement and the concerning 
decision passed by the Constitutional Court analysed above is sufficiently 
indicative. Para. 1 of Article 2 shall have to be supplemented by a provision in 
the Constitution, which—under certain circumstances— exceptionally facilitates 
the transfer of sovereign rights and of exercise of powers.  
 b) The participation of the Republic of Hungary in an international co-
operation and international organisations (e.g. NATO) is de lege lata vaguely 
substantiated constitutionally. It is not accidental that e.g. the German Grund-
gesetz addresses the problem in a separate article (Article 24), and so do the 
French (Article 15 of the Preamble), the Italian (Article 11), the Norwegian (Article 
93) and the Spanish constitutions (Article 93). These articles are incorporated 
into these constitutions irrespectively of separate provisions concerning 
international treaties. The reason for this duality is that the conclusion of an 
international treaty does not necessarily incur either the transfer of sovereign 
rights and of exercise of powers, or the limitation of sovereignty. 
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 c) The urgency of the settlement under the Constitution gains special 
relevance since the issue of the constitutionality of the transfer always arises 
with respect to concrete sovereign rights or powers, which is primarily not a par 
excellence issue of constitutional law, but an issue that is related to another 
branch of law, behind which, however, the constitutionality of the transfer is 
posited as a preliminary question. 
 From this viewpoint, the frequently quoted Kehlrinne-Decision of the 
German Supreme Court, the Bundesgerichtshof (hereinafter: BGH) (BGHZ 
102, 118, GRUR 1988. 4. 290-Decision of 3rd of November, 1987) can be 
construed as an instructive instance. 
 ca) According to the facts of the case, the defendant is the proprietor of a 
European patent, which the European Patent Office (hereinafter: EPO) granted 
in 1977 with an effect to the German Federal Republic. The patent description 
was submitted in English, whereas, the patent claims were submitted in 
German, too. 
 According to the plaintiff, the patent in the German Federal Republic could 
not have a legal effect, since the patent description was not submitted in 
German, besides, only the English version had a binding force. According to 
Article 65 of the European Patent Convention (hereinafter: EPC) any member 
state has carte blanche whether it prescribes in a domestic statute the 
obligation of the submission of the patent description translated into its official 
language to the national patent office. The German Federal Republic did not 
stipulate that as an obligation and the legal status quo arisen thereby (which 
consists in the negligence of the prescription of the obligation to submit the 
patent description in German language by the GFR) contradicts several 
provisions of the Grundgesetz, especially Article 24 concerning the transfer of 
public authority, furthermore, also pertains to (restricts) the essential content of 
fundamental rights as guaranteed under Articles 2, 3, 12 and Para. 2 of Article 
103 (the free development of personality, the right to the free choice of 
profession, the prohibition of discrimination), and finally, it violates the 
criteria of security in law originating in the rule of law. The competent court 
thereby rejected the claim, which was remitted to the BGH by reason of the 
appeal by the plaintiff. 
 In its appeal, the plaintiff requested the nullification of the patent, partly, 
because the respective statute, i.e., Article 65 of the EPC, which substantiates 
it on legal grounds, is unconstitutional in the absence of the German domestic 
regulation on the subject. Hence, the plaintiff requested the suspension of the 
procedure and submitted a request of reviewing the case to the German Federal 
Constitutional Court. 
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 cb) As the BGH established, the patent was submitted and published in 
English language with the application of Paras. 1, 3 and 7 of Article 14 of the 
EPC, and it was supplemented with the German translation of the patent claim. 
Consequently, since the EPO proceeded according to the provisions of the EPC, 
and since the EPO is not a German institution, it does not exercise either 
German sovereign rights or German public authority, therefore, a violation of 
the German statutes cannot obtain in that case. The EPO, when it grants European 
patents and exercises transnational sovereign rights, proceeds as pursuant to 
the EPC relying on the scope of competence transferred to it by the Contracting 
States. 
 Nevertheless, the BGH has to examine as a preliminary question, which 
emerges in the context of constitutional law, if patent law as the object of legal 
dispute can be considered as validly constituted in the German Federal Republic. 
Hence, the BGH has powers to decide on the constitutional problem whether 
those European patents can be generally considered as validly constituted in 
the German Federal Republic, which are not published in their full text and are 
inaccessible in German language.  
 The BGH departed from the fact that concerning the language criteria of 
European patents in the German Federal Republic, Articles 14 and 70 of the 
EPC shall be deemed as applicable and governing. With reference to that, the 
Court did not agree with the plaintiff that the standpoint of the German law-
maker incurred an unconstitutional situation (negligence), when it did not 
proceed in compliance with the authorisation under Article 65. 
 cc) According to the BGH, when the German Federal Republic acceded to 
the EPC, it transferred its sovereign rights in terms of granting European 
patents to the European Patent Organisation, and within that scope to the 
EPO, in full compliance with Article 24 of the Grundgesetz. It is the Grund-
gesetz itself that defines the limits of openness in the direction of interstate co-
operation, which, according to the BGH are the following: the transfer of 
sovereign rights in the scope of an international convention shall not affect the 
foundations of the German constitutional order and the basic structures 
constituted by that shall not be renounced or emptied out for the sake of 
international co-operation. The essential content of fundamental rights attached 
to the bases of the constitutional order as constituted as pursuant to the 
Grundgesetz shall not be affected or made relative by the transfer of sovereign 
rights (“nicht relativiert ... werden”). 
 Therefore, the BGH did not deem that it was unconstitutional to construct 
the patent as the object of legal dispute on such a legislative basis and in such a 
legislative setting, in which the German lawmaker did not take the opportunity 
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for restrictive language regulation as pursuant to Article 65 of EPC. Therefore, 
a case of unconstitutional negligence did not obtain.  
 For Hungary, that decision is extraordinarily important, since our country 
has been invited to join the Contracting Members of the EPC. Our accession 
to the NATO constitutes also a transfer the exercise of powers to an other major 
international organisation, which has a broader scope of membership than 
the EU. 
 2.2. The settlement of the issue on the level of the Hungarian constitution is 
furthermore deemed as necessary, because that is the only instrument available 
for the codification of a doctrinal claim for the establishment of an “open 
state”, a “kooperativer Verfassungsstaat” towards international co-operation.   
 2.3. It is obvious that a constitutional transfer of sovereign rights cannot be 
implemented to international organisations in general, but within that scope 
exclusively to interstate organisations—however, both non-interstate organi-
sations and NGOs are excluded from that scope. To make the problem simple, 
we can assert that the transfer can exclusively be implemented via an inter-
national treaty, so that the established organisation is the subject of international 
law. In that case, the founding forces of international organisations are the 
states, which are themselves the subjects of international law.  
 2.4. The transfer, however, is constitutional, since it is the Constitution 
itself that frames its criteria, i.e. its limits in a restrictive sense. These limits, on 
the grounds of the doctrinal considerations above, would be the following:  
— The fundamental limit of the transfer is the principle of subsidiarity, which 
implies that the transfer can be implemented exclusively if  
 — it is necessary by the efficient administration of quasi-public duties, 
 — it is deemed as inevitably necessary by reason of the occurrence of a 
problem, which transgresses borders and has an international dimension. 
— The transfer may not affect the fundamental set of values of the consti-
tutional order, i.e., the structure of the Hungarian Constitution.  
— Following the transfer of sovereign rights, the protection of fundamental 
rights guaranteed under the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary and 
international human rights treaties, constitutive elements of the Hungarian 
legal system shall be secured on the grounds of the constitutional order. 
 2.5. The amendment of the Constitution would not imply the annulment of 
the currently effective Para. 2 of the Article 6, but the new regulation would 
align as an adjunct to this provision. 
 2.6. It needs to be noted that Article 10a) of the Czech Constitutional 
Amendment as of 18 October 2001 quoted above grants express authorisation—
“Certain powers of the organs of the Czech Republic may be transferred to inter-
THE LEGAL DOCTRINE AND LEGAL POLICY ASPECTS OF THE EU-ACCESSION 159 
  
national organisations or institutions in the scope of international agreements”—
with a simultaneous specification of its conditions.   
 
3. A special sub-category of the transfer of sovereign rights and exercise of 
powers: Accession to the European Union 
 
3.1. The accession of Hungary to the EU necessitates the analysis of three 
issues following from the doctrinal questions as explicated above: 
 a) What is the legal character of the EU? 
 b) What is the legal character of Community-law (Union law)? 
 c) Consequently, we are posed with the question whether the requirement 
of the incorporation of a special rule into the Constitution obtains, and if so, 
what does that requirement consist in. In other words: can the EU-accession be 
resolved by the settlement of the duality of the relationship between inter-
national law and domestic law and of the transfer of sovereign rights, or a 
separate third provision is deemed as necessary.  
 3.2. Concerning the legal character of the EU as an organisation three 
viewpoints have developed.25  
 a) According to one of these viewpoints, the EU is postulated as a federal 
state, while, according to the other it is classified as a special international 
organisation among the subjects of international law. Whereas, according to 
the third viewpoint, a so-called autonomous conception, it is a sui generis 
formation, which cannot be categorised as either of the above.  
 b) The third conception can be construed as a majority viewpoint. Its specific 
emergence is related to the introduction of the term of the „association of 
states“ (Staatenverbund) in the Maastricht-Judgement of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court. The Maastricht-Judgement denied both that the EU could 
be  posited as a state or as a federal state—the unique situation, according to 
the Federal Constitutional Court, is reflected in the moment of the introduction 
of the specific term itself (see, Opinion of Court, C II).26 


 
25
 Schweitzer, M.—Hummer, W.: Europarecht, 5th Edition, Berlin, 1996. 83–88. 
 
26
 The term of the “association of states” is a novelty only in legal practice, however, 
besides the terms of the federal state and confederation, it has been established in new 
German technical literature for a long time. Jellinek, G.: Allgemeine Staatslehre, 1917, 
738., quoted in: Rittner, F.: Az Európai Unió útja a szövetségi állam felé (The Develop-
ment of the European Union in the Direction of a Federal State), Jogtudományi Közlöny, 
6. (1995) 286., note 14., which, in an interesting manner, draws a parallel with the 
Austrian-Hungarian Empire following the enactment of the Pragmatica Sanctio.  
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 With respect to these, the EU is an unique international institution, an 
interstate organisation, which is constantly evolving and is in the process of 
incessant integration, and, to which certain sovereign rights have been trans-
ferred by the German Federal Republic.  
 3.3. Concerning the legal character of Community law, there is a debate 
between traditionalists and autonomists, the latter of whom constitute a 
majority.27  
 a) Traditionalists postulate that Community law falls under the scope of 
international law. 
 b) According to autonomists, although, primary law has been framed via 
international treaties, this ontological feature shall by no means prejudge 
the legal character of the legal system. Autonomists emphasise the dual 
character of Community law.28 Which implies that in its framework the 
international legal characteristics are supplemented by the pecularities of 
constitutional law, since the EU is constituted on an international treaty. The 
specificity is contained in the fact that this nature of constitutional law is not 
linked to a state, but to a specific (sui generis) international, interstate 
organisation.  
 ba) The European Court developed this conception in its Van Gend en Loos-
Decision,29 which is considered as a leading case, then somewhat modified it 
in its Costa/ENEL-Decision.30 While the Van Gend en Loos-Decision was 
based on an emphasis on the character of international law, the impressively 
pathetic phrasing of the opinion of the court in the Costa/ENEL-Decision was 
positively framed in compliance with the doctrine of a sui generis legal system 
and its revoke is not admissible by subsequent unilateral national jurisdiction 
of the member states. 
 bb) Secondary law shares in the fate of the legal character of primary 
norms. According to the autonomists, it is neither international, nor national 
law, since it originates in an autonomous source of law: it is constituted partly 
on primary law, partly on Community law as a new public authority. 

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 Schweitzer—Hummer: op. cit., 75–82. 
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 See, Grundgesetz. Kommentar, note 6., 360 and 366. See, in note 278, the conception 
of Walter Hallstein and Manfred Zuleeg, according to which, although the founding 
treaty of the European Economic Community “was framed in the scope of an inter-
national agreement, it qualifies as a constitutional document of a community of rights 
(Verfassungsurkunde)”. 
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 Várnay—Papp: Az Európai Unió joga (The Law of the European Union), (note 
13), 202. 
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 Vörös, I. Az európai versenyjogok kézikönyve (The Handbook of European 
Competition Law), Budapest, 1996, 375. 
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 bc) As a conclusion, we can state that Community law precedes the consti-
tutions of the member states. Therefore, Community law cannot be measured 
against the norms of the constitutions of the member states, so, conceptually, it 
cannot be “unconstitutional”. The limits of the autonomist conception are 
ultimately defined (and made relative with respect to fundamental rights) by 
the legal practice of the constitutional courts of the member states as analysed 
above (II.1.1.b).  
 bd) It needs to be noted that Article 51 of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights has recently introduced the notion of “Union law”, without determining 
its positive content and meaning. As a matter of fact, it is clear that the scope 
of that notion is broader than that of Community law (law of the EU). 
 3.4. With respect to the above and to the system of requirements as set 
forth by Jen Czuczai,31 we assume the following legal political consequences: 
 3.4.1. The issue of the EU-Accession cannot be discussed merely in the 
scope of the relationship between international law and domestic law, since 
Community law cannot be construed as exclusively a legal material of inter-
national law, the issue of the EU-Accession cannot be discussed merely in the 
scope of the transfer of sovereign rights or of exercise of powers. The exercise 
of sovereign rights opens up the way to the inflow of the norms of a such a legal 
system, which cannot be measured against the norms of national constitutions 
(disregarding the terrain of fundamental rights, the relevance of which cannot be 
underestimated), so that legal system is superior to the constitutions of the 
member states. 
 3.4.2. So long as the tripartite hierarchy in the relationship between inter-
national law and domestic law is dominated by the national constitution, to 
which international law is subordinated, whereas domestic statutes are positioned 
at the bottom of the hierarchy, the EU as an international organisation and its 
legal system, i.e., Community law (Union law) demonstrate such features, 
which incur dual consequences.  
 — On the one hand, these features exclude its classification as an inter-
national organisation or international law, as a consequence of which a potential 
constitutional provision pertaining to the relationship between international law 
and domestic law is inapplicable and senseless.  
 — On the other hand, in this case the hierarchy turns upside-down: 
Community law is positioned at the top of the hierarchy, whereas the constitution 
of the member state (except for fundamental rights) is positioned in the middle, 
while other domestic statutes are subordinated to these.  


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 3.5. Following from the above, a third scope of issues has to be analysed. 
Namely, framing a special constitutional provision, a specific “Europe Clause” 
has become inevitable in legal-political terms, as well.  
 With respect to the EU-Accession, we need to address all of the three 
issues as analysed above, since the Europe Clause cannot be framed without the 
constitutional settlement of both the relationship between international law and 
domestic law, and of the problem of the transfer of the exercise of powers. This 
clause can exclusively be constructed on the grounds of the analysis of the 
former two problems, although the settlement of these separately, or of the 
other two combined cannot supersede the settlement of the third one.  
 It is not accidental that a so-called Europe Clause, related to the adoption 
of the Maastricht Treaty, was incorporated into the Grundgesetz in 1992. 
Since, on the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty it became obvious that Article 
24, in itself, providing on the transfer of sovereign rights cannot sufficiently 
justify an economic and political integration with such depth and character on 
constitutional grounds. Article 23 designates participation in the advancement of 
the European Union as a state objective. This has been defined as the consti-
tutional obligation of all state organs: it is an obligation that can be demanded 
by the Federal Constitutional Court. It is a further issue that the limits of that 
obligation with respect to the German Grundgesetz and the fundamental rights 
guaranteed under its provisions were determined by the Federal Constitutional 
Court under its Maastricht- and Solange-Judgements.  
 3.6. In our point of new, framing the Europe Clause will postulate the 
following legal-political requirements:  
 — It needs to be asserted that participation in the European economic-
political integration is a constitutional objective of the state, which needs to be 
framed in general phrasing first in the Preamble, then also in particular in the 
Europe Clause by setting forth the conditions. Such conditions, in accordance 
with Para. 1 of Article 2 of the Constitution, can be, e.g., that the European 
Union is based on the democratic rule of law, on a commitment to social values 
as well as on the respect of fundamental constitutional values and the traditions 
of the member states.  
 — With respect to the protection of fundamental rights, it needs to be 
asserted that Community (Union) law shall not have priority until a European 
Constitution has been adopted, which as a minimum standard meets the 
protection level framed under the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
 — It needs to be asserted that certain powers exercised by the Republic of 
Hungary may be transferred to the Union in the process of the continuous 
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advancement of the EU integration. Of course, the word “certain” has ultimate 
relevance here, to which the Constitutional Court shall render adequate content. 
Such a provision can only be framed with bianco-content. This phrase could 
guarantee that the constantly evolving and vaguely outlined framework of the 
integration and its legal system shall not “absorb” the state-formation and the 
legal system of the Republic of Hungary.  
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
1. The relationship between the Constitution and the EU-Accession is a 
complicated issue, in which three problems so far highly disregarded by the 
Hungarian Constitution are linked. In our view, a “tripod”, closely and 
inseparably related regulation, which needs to be codified simultaneously, is an 
essential precondition of the accession. Its settlement—or at least its „full 
preparation“—cannot be further postponed.  
 2. The proposed amendment of the constitution, however, opens up „a 
new chapter“ in the history of Hungarian constitutionalism and Hungarian 
constitutional law and of the constitutional structure of the Republic of Hungary. 
The amendments would facilitate that the Constitution constituted a public 
authority beyond its scope. By this „opening-up“, the Constitution would have 
significance beyond itself, because thereby, it would crosscut and make 
relative the traditional conception of the nation–state monopoly of the exercise 
of public authority. Therefore, the currently effective Para. 1 of Article 2 of the 
Constitution would remain in force, but its content and scope, along with the 
inner structure of the Hungarian Constitution would radically change in the 
spirit of a 21st century Europeanism.  
 It is regrettable that the amendment of the constitution as pursuant to Act 
LXI of 2002 fails address the questions above, besides, the relationship 
between the constitution and the EU is made even more ambiguous by the 
incorporation of the amended Article 2/A. Hence, we assume that a further and 
broad amendment of the Constitution is inevitable.  
 
 
 
